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A distinguishing property of human intelligence is the ability to flexibly use language in
order to communicate complex ideas with other humans in a variety of contexts. Research
in natural language dialogue should focus on designing communicative agents which can
integrate themselves into these contexts and productively collaborate with humans.
In this abstract, we propose a general situated language learning paradigm which is
designed to bring about robust language agents able to cooperate productively with humans.
This dialogue paradigm is built on a utilitarian definition of language understanding.
Language is one of multiple tools which an agent may use to accomplish goals in its
environment. We say an agent “understands” language only when it is able to use language
productively to accomplish these goals. Under this definition, an agent’s communication
success reduces to its success on tasks within its environment.
This setup contrasts with many conventional natural language tasks, which maximize
linguistic objectives derived from static datasets. Such applications often make the mistake
of reifying language as an end in itself. The tasks prioritize an isolated measure of linguistic
intelligence (often one of linguistic competence, in the sense of Chomsky (1965)), rather
than measuring a model’s effectiveness in real-world scenarios.1 Our utilitarian definition
is motivated by recent successes in reinforcement learning methods. In a reinforcement
learning setting, agents maximize success metrics on real-world tasks, without requiring
direct supervision of linguistic behavior.
The environment
We propose an end-to-end learning environment with multiple language-enabled agents,
each with the capacity to define their own internal goals and plans to reach those goals.
Each agent may also have different capacities to observe or act in this environment. Their
goals are grounded non-linguistic objectives: for example, to reach a desired location,
manipulate objects in the environment, or transmit a piece of information.2 (We address
the issue of non-linguistic grounding at length in the next section.) Some fixed-language
agents in the environment speak an existing conventional language (e.g. English), and
other learning agents are tasked with jointly learning this language while also solving other
goals in the environment. The agents are assigned difficult (possibly distinct) tasks which
1Our motivation here is similar to that of Dagan et al. (2006), who recognized the negative effects of a community
fragmented across different isolated application-specific tasks, and suggested the unified task of recognizing textual
entailment (RTE) as a solution.
2A related line of work in evolutionary linguistics constructs a similar language learning scenario entirely without
fixed-language agents (Smith et al., 2003; Steels, 2012; Kirby et al., 2014). All of the agents in these environments
construct a novel language simultaneously to accomplish some shared task. This is an interesting separate line
of research, but ultimately a separate task from the understanding and acquisition problems discussed in this
abstract.
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require them to cooperate by communicating via their language channel.3
In the simplest instance of the paradigm above, a single fixed-language parent agent
interacts with a learning child agent. The parent cooperates with the child, but only
when prompted through language. As a result, the child acquires the language of the
parent in order to accomplish its task. This specific scenario is designed to train single
communicative agents which can accomplish tasks in their environments with the help of
human or simulated counterparts.
It is possible to include fixed-language agents in these environments without requiring
human involvement. We have developed several instantiations of this paradigm in which
the fixed-language agents speak some simplified hard-coded English or an artificial language
(e.g. a programming language or query language). Near the limit of artificial complexity,
agents might take advantage of the Internet to access world knowledge and synthesize
responses. As our algorithms for learning in these environments improve, however, we
expect that involving human agents in the environment would be an extremely effective
way to train language-enabled artificial agents.
Environment grounding
Our language-learning agents crucially need to be grounded in a world which is not only
linguistic. This grounding may be physical — for example, agents which are embodied
in the real world — or virtual. This grounding is what allows us to evaluate the agents
in some way that does not prioritize language as the only objective. Grounding imposes
additional responsibilities on the agent, such as competently sensing and acting in the
world, but this should be seen as an opportunity rather than a problem. As we discuss in
the following paragraphs, a grounded agent may use its experience in its environment to
build better models of language, and likewise use its language to better reason about its
environment.
This grounded environment is designed to bring about agents with comprehensive predic-
tive models of the world, which combine linguistic knowledge with more general intelligent
behavior. By design, we do not separate the activity of language model construction
from many other intelligent predictive activities — whether physical (predicting physical
behavior of objects), psychological (modeling the beliefs and intentions of other agents), or
social (understanding group membership and group-level action) (Lake et al., 2016; Clark,
2013). While early instantiations of this environment will limit the complexity necessary
for the agents to model, we expect all of these different factors to eventually be relevant in
a comprehensive learning environment.
Mikolov et al. (2015) make a similar argument for grounding, but arrive at an environment
in which perception and action is mediated only through a linguistic channel. While this
textual interface certainly has the potential to simplify the problem, we believe there are
several issues with this setup.
Textual interfaces impose a lossy representation of an agent’s actual environment (Brooks,
3 Much of the recent novel work in dialogue-based learning (Fleischman and Roy, 2005; Vogel et al., 2014;
Wang et al., 2016; Weston, 2016) and multi-agent communication (Lazaridou et al., 2016; Andreas and Klein,
2016; Foerster et al., 2016; Sukhbaatar et al., 2016) can be fit into the paradigm described so far. This paper is
concerned with designing a general paradigm for language-learning which contains these experiments, and picking
out properties of the learning environment which are important for future research.
1991), and necessarily bias the focus of an agent’s observations. Consider the following
text-only interaction in the style of Mikolov et al. (2015) between a learning agent A and
omniscient agent B, situated in some simulated physical world:
B: You are carrying a box of eggs and need to set them down.
A: Is there a table nearby?
B: There is a table to your left.
A: I put the box on the table.
B: The box slides off of the table and the eggs break open.
[The table is missing a leg and tilted when the box was laid down.]
The agent could have avoided this disaster if it had queried to find out that the table was
missing a leg before placing weight on it. But we cannot expect an agent to exhaustively
query its environment via text in general. (Should it also ask whether the table is made of
solid material, or whether the table is on fire?) By contrast, a lossless visual observation
does not remove possibly relevant information about the properties of tables, and it is up
to the agent to learn what to attend to in such an environment and how to interpret these
visual percepts.
For environments involving pre-programmed fixed-language agents, generating textual
environment descriptions also places a significant implementational burden. It is relatively
easy to generate physical motion and visual renderings of three-legged tables or toppling
events, but much more difficult to describe these concepts in natural language.
Of course, even if we claim that text data is not enough, we must settle for some level of
abstraction. A similar argument to the one above could be made for including sound-wave
speech data in the agent’s observations rather than only providing text and visual data.
While this argument is likely also correct, we have to settle for a level of representation
which is computationally tractable. Given that we want to make near-term progress on
language comprehension and production, it seems reasonable to work with messages in text
representation for the time being. It is likewise tractable to work in a virtual environment
with simulated physics and visual inputs.
Conclusion
In this abstract, we outlined a paradigm for grounded and goal-driven language learning
in artificial agents. The paradigm is centered around a utilitarian definition of language
understanding, which equates language understanding with the ability to cooperate with
other language users in real-world environments. This position demotes language from
its position as a separate task to be solved to one of several communicative tools agents
might use to accomplish their real-world goals.
While this paradigm does already capture a small amount of recent work in dialogue, on
the whole it has not received the focus it deserves in the research communities of natural
language processing and machine learning. We hope this paper brings focus to the task of
situated language learning as a way forward for research in natural language dialogue.
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